Evolution and utilitarianism: Social contract III
The paper takes the simplest possible bargaining game as a paradigm for the coordination problem—i.e. the problem of selecting an equilibrium when many are available. The aim is to explore the circumstances under which evolution will lead to a utilitarian conclusion. Copyright George Mason University 1990
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Binmore, Ken |
Published in: |
Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 1.1990, 2, p. 1-26
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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