Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Robles, Jack |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 34.2001, 2, p. 312-330
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Subject: | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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