EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING-STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one-sided commitment power the 'proposer' (almost) receives the whole pie while the 'responder' is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric <link rid="b8">Nash</link> (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155-162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one-parameter family of games ( <link rid="b2">Fischer et al. </link>, Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17-33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay-off implications define the evolutionary set-up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.