Evolution of cooperation in lattice population with adaptive interaction intensity
We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively interaction intensity. Individuals adjust their interaction intensity according to the rules “payoff increase-high intensity, payoff decrease-low intensity”: if an individual’s payoff increases compared with that in the previous generation, he raises his interaction intensity; otherwise, he reduces the probability of interaction. We find that if individuals can adjust their interaction intensity with a proper scale, cooperation can be promoted. Interestingly, individuals with low interaction intensity usually hold the boundary of cooperator cluster. Such spatial distribution can alleviate the exploitation from defectors to cooperators since the interaction between cooperators and defectors is weakened. We hope our work can yield some insight into investigation of the evolution of cooperation in structured population.
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Li, Zhi ; Gao, Jia ; Suh, Il Hong ; Wang, Long |
Published in: |
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. - Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4371. - Vol. 392.2013, 9, p. 2046-2051
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Cooperation | Lattice | Adaptive interaction intensity |
Saved in:
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