Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Naidu, Suresh ; Hwang, Sung-Ha ; Bowles, Samuel |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 109.2010, 1, p. 31-33
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Stochastic stability Nash bargaining solution Multiple equilibria Intentionality Idiosyncratic play |
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