Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Friedman, Daniel ; Ostrov, Daniel N. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 2, p. 743-777
|
Subject: | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Bevölkerung | Population | Theorie | Theory |
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