Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionary stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.

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Year of publication:	2003-04
Authors:	Hehenkamp, Burkhard ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Possajennikov, Alex
Institutions:	Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Dortmund

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005642215