Evolutionary selection of 'chivalrous' conventions in coordination games without common expectations
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sacco, Pier Luigi |
Other Persons: | Sandri, Marco (contributor) |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 11.1996, 4, p. 663-681
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Soziale Werte | Social values | Theorie | Theory |
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