Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Akyol, Ethem |
Published in: |
Dynamic games and applications : DGA. - Boston : Birkhäuser, ISSN 2153-0793, ZDB-ID 2581474-6. - Vol. 12.2022, 4, p. 1189-1220
|
Subject: | Bayesian incentive compatibility | Boston mechanism | Deferred acceptance mechanism | Ex-ante welfare | Incomplete information | School choice |
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