Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Bikhchandani, Sushil
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New York, NY : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 369-393
Publisher:	New York, NY : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Ex post incentive compatibility \| multi-dimensional information \| interdependent values

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	895580160 [GVK] hdl:10419/150084 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:182 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599375