Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Fujinaka, Yuji ; Miyakawa, Toshiji |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 91.2020, p. 157-164
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Subject: | Ex-post incentive compatibility | Ex-post individual rationality | Housing market | Interdependent values | Random assignment | Wohnungsmarkt | Immobilienpreis | Real estate price | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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