Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power

This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Kitamura, Hiroshi
Other Persons:	Matsushima, Noriaki (contributor) ; Sato, Misato (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungsmacht \| Bargaining power \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Vertriebsbindung \| Exclusive dealing

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 151, pp 1-3, February 2017 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 1, 2017 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2836769 [DOI]
Classification:	L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983550