Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment
Year of publication: |
2004-06
|
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Authors: | Meza, David de ; Selvaggi, Mariano |
Institutions: | Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), University of Bristol |
Subject: | exclusive dealing | non-cooperative bargaining | liquidated damages | renegotiation | resale |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 35 pages |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts |
Source: |
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