Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brunello, Giorgio ; Graziano, Clara ; Parigi, Bruno |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 19.2001, 1/2, p. 133-161
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Lohn | Wages | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Schätzung | Estimation | Italien | Italy |
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