Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Brunello, Giorgio ; Graziano, Clara ; Parigi, Bruno Maria |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Lohn | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Theorie | Executive compensation | Principal-agent |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 50.1997 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/154813 [Handle] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: |
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