Executive compensation and the susceptibility of firms to hostile takeovers. An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil industry
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Nowak, Eric ; Haid, Michael H. |
Publisher: |
Frankfurt a. M. : Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Subject: | Corporate Governance | Übernahme | Führungskräfte | Vergütungssystem | Mineralölwirtschaft | Schätzung | USA | Compensation Contracting | Executive Compensation | Oil Industry | Takeovers |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/76944 [Handle] |
Classification: | G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: |
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