Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Year of publication: |
2003-07
|
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Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian ; Fried, Jesse M. |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | CF LS published as Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Jesse M. Fried. "Executive Compensation As An Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, v17(3,Summer), 71-92. Number 9813 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure |
Source: |
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