Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Vashishtha, Rahul |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 104.2012, 1, p. 70-88
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Equity incentives | Risk-taking incentives | Systematic and idiosyncratic risk | Hedging | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lohn | Wages | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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