Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?
In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero. Copyright (c) 2006 Financial Management Association International.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Deshmukh, Sanjay ; Howe, Keith M. ; Luft, Carl |
Published in: |
Financial Management. - Financial Management Association - FMA. - Vol. 35.2006, 1, p. 87-106
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Publisher: |
Financial Management Association - FMA |
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