Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miller, Nicholas R. |
Published in: |
The Oxford handbook of public choice ; volume 2. - New York : Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-046980-1. - 2019
|
Subject: | Veto | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Verfassung | Constitution |
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