Existence of equilibria in auctions with private values

Srihari Govindan; Robert Wilson

A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids

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Year of publication:	2010 ; Rev. July 2010
Authors:	Govindan, Srihari ; Wilson, Robert
Publisher:	Stanford, Calif. : Univ., Graduate School of Business
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Werttheorie \| Theory of value \| Rationalität \| Rationality \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (13 S.)
Series:	Research paper series / Stanford Graduate School of Business. - Stanford, Calif., ZDB-ID 2432873-X. - Vol. 2056R Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series ; No. 2056
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1639599 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003991784