Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Wichardt, Philipp C. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 10029448. - Vol. 63.2008, 1, p. 366-369
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