Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
by Ohad Kadan, Philip J. Reny and Jeroen M. Swinkels
| Year of publication: |
May 2017
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| Authors: | Kadan, Ohad ; Reny, Philip J. ; Swinkels, Jeroen M. |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 85.2017, 3, p. 769-823
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| Subject: | Principal-agent problem | existence | optimal mechanism | moral hazard | adverse selection | randomization | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/ECTA12340 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778813