Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
| Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kadan, Ohad ; Reny, Philip J. ; Swinkels, Jeroen M. |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 85.2017, 3, p. 769-823
|
| Subject: | Principal-agent problem | existence | optimal mechanism | moral hazard | adverse selection | randomization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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