Expectations vs. fundamentals-driven bank runs : when should bailouts be permitted?
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Keister, Todd ; Narasiman, Vijay |
Published in: |
Review of economic dynamics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1094-2025, ZDB-ID 1406100-4. - Vol. 21.2016, p. 89-104
|
Subject: | Bank runs | Bailouts | Financial stability | Moral hazard | Macroprudential regulation | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Bankenliquidität | Bank liquidity | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision |
-
Bank bailouts : moral hazard and commitment
Sim, Khai Zhi, (2024)
-
Supply and demand effects of bank bailouts : depositors need not apply and need not run
Berger, Allen N., (2023)
-
Bailouts and financial fragility
Keister, Todd, (2014)
- More ...
-
Expectations versus fundamentals: Does the cause of banking panics matter for prudential policy?
Keister, Todd, (2011)
-
Expectations versus Fundamentals : Does the Cause of Banking Panics Matter for Prudential Policy?
Keister, Todd, (2011)
-
Essays in Household Finance and Bank Regulation
Narasiman, Vijay, (2017)
- More ...