Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
I consider situations in which a group of players extracts a value if they organise themselves in different network structures, and I define a solution concept to describe the decentralised decision that determines the network formation process and the allocation of the value. I demonstrate that there is a solution concept satisfying discounted expected versions of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky J Econ Theory 71:44–74, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1996</CitationRef>) and fairness (Myerson Math Oper Res 2:225–229, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1977a</CitationRef>) jointly with the requirement that the allocation rule be component efficient if the players’ discount factor is sufficiently low. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Navarro, Noemí |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 43.2014, 2, p. 287-308
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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