Experimental Games and Climate Coalitions
How can games be used to solve the climae stalemate? In this short interview Alessandro Tavoni, research fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the LSE and associate researcher at FEEM, gives practical examples on how experimental games can be integrated into more traditional lines of research on coalition formation and stability.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Tavoni, Alessandro |
Published in: |
Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re3. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM). - 2014, November
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Publisher: |
Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
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