Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model.
The authors find that subjects' behavior in an incomplete-information, repeated-game experiment is roughly a sequent ial equilibrium. The deviations from sequential equilibrium can be ex plained by the existence of a "homemade prior" probability (about 1 7 percent) that players will cooperate even when they should not. The authors conclude that equilibrium concepts which are more complicate d than Nash (such as sequential) can describe individual behavior wel l enough that theories using such equilibrium concepts are plausible. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Camerer, Colin ; Weigelt, Keith |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 56.1988, 1, p. 1-36
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
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