Experiments in organizational economics

Front Cover -- Experiments in Organizational Economics -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction: Experiments in Organizational Economics -- Communication within Organizations -- The Not-for-Profit Sector -- Group Identity and Socialization -- Employees' Self-Selection -- Incentives and Productivity -- Spillovers -- Corrigendum -- References -- The Effect of Structured Emotion Expression on Reciprocity in Bilateral Gift Exchange -- Introduction -- Experimental Methods -- Experimental Hypotheses -- Results -- The Use of Structured Emotion Expression -- Manager Wage Decisions -- Employee Effort Decisions -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Appendix -- Cheap Talk Games: Comparing Direct and Simplified Replications -- Introduction -- The Sender-Receiver Game -- Experimental Design and Procedure -- Experimental Results -- Sender Message and Receiver Action -- Replicate Treatment -- Simplified Treatment -- Message Sophistication -- Information Transmission -- Level-k Type Classification -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Appendix -- Understanding Social Impact Bonds and Their Alternatives: An Experimental Investigation -- Introduction -- A Review of the Literature -- Not-For-Profits -- Institutional Settings -- Social Impact Bonds -- Theoretical Framework and Predictions -- Basic Set-Up -- Benchmark Contract (First-Best) -- Inputs-Based Contract -- Performance-Based Contract -- Social Impact Bond -- Predictions -- Experiment -- Experimental Design -- Parameterised Predictions -- Experimental Implementation -- Experimental Results -- Treatment 1 -- Governments' Contract Offer -- Governments' Contract Offer Design Choice -- Not-For-Profits' Effort -- Payoffs and Social Surplus -- Treatment 2 -- Governments' Contract Offer -- Governments' Contract Offer Design Choice.