Explaining Corporativism and Corruption
A simple contract-theoretic model is used to show that, in a democratic system, positive political rents and efficient provision of public goods can characterize an equilibrium in the political contest. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable under the assumption that a fraction of the political rents can be shared with a subgroup of voters through corporativist arrangements. These features correspond fairly well to the presidential and corporativist political system of post-revolutionary Mexico.
Year of publication: |
2001-05
|
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Authors: | González-Morales, Luis G. |
Institutions: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Dortmund |
Saved in:
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