Exploiting future settlements : a signalling model of most-favored-nation clauses in settlement bargaining
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Daughety, Andrew F. ; Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 35.2004, 3, p. 467-485
|
Subject: | Meistbegünstigung | Most favoured nation | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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