Export cartels and domestic markets

This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the icnreased possiblity for collusion in both markets. A condition is given under which this is the case.

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Year of publication:	1999-02
Authors:	Schultz, Christian
Institutions:	Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut
Subject:	export cartels \| tacit collusion \| multimarket contact

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CIE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 2(3), 223-246, 2002 Number 1999-04 24 pages
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749446