Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Lambertini, Luca |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Duopol | Duopoly | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneurship approach | Zeit | Time |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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