Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare

A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.

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Year of publication:	2008-12
Authors:	Femminis, Gianluca ; Martini, Gianmaria
Institutions:	Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Subject:	RJV \| R&D \| collusion

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number itemq0852 nn pages
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650755