Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks
Year of publication: |
February 2017
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Authors: | Salter, Alexander William ; Veetil, Vipin ; White, Lawrence H. |
Published in: |
The quarterly review of economics and finance : journal of the Midwest Economics Association ; journal of the Midwest Finance Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9769, ZDB-ID 1114217-0. - Vol. 63.2017, p. 153-160
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Subject: | Bagehot hypothesis | Deposit insurance | Double liability | Moral hazard | Triple liability | Unlimited liability | Moral Hazard | Haftung | Liability | Einlagensicherung | Theorie | Theory | Haftpflichtversicherung | Liability insurance | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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