Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Peleg, Bezalel ; Zamir, Shemuʾel |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 39.2012, 1, p. 91-125
|
Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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