External Resource Provision and High-Quality Innovation : Evidence on Private Managerial Myopia Under Reverse Mixed-Ownership Reform in China
Chinese privately-owned enterprises (POEs) play critical roles in the Chinese economy, but they are ‘resource cursed’. Moreover, managerial myopia is particularly serious. Using a sample of POEs from 2008–2020, this paper finds that managerial myopia is inversely related to innovation performance. State ownership stimulates innovation for POEs; however, it inhibits innovation performance due to managerial myopia. In addition, government subsidies negatively moderate the relationship between managerial myopia and high-quality innovation under the reform, whereas tax incentives positively moderate the relationship. Additional analyses indicate that a reduction in financing costs induces high-quality innovation for POEs
Year of publication: |
[2023]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gu, Xuehua |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | China | Privatisierung | Privatization | Innovation |
Saved in:
freely available
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