Factionalsim, Violence and Bargaining in Civil Wars
We consider the problem of conflict resolution between a state and a sub-state challenger in a civil war. Until now, the literature on civil war bargaining has largely assumed that each side in the conflict negotiates as a unitary actor. The present paper extends our understanding of this problem by making the more realistic assumption that one or both sides enters the bargaining process as a heterogeneous actor, subject to competing internal perspectives on the value of negotiations. We find that the prospects for a settlement and the stability of any settlement that might be achieved are significantly complicated by the assumption of internal heterogeneity. We study the implications of this assumption for each side’s ability to attain a cooperative agreement and maintain that agreement in the face of violent opposition.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | McCormick, Gordon H. ; Owen, Guillermo |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 20.2004, p. 361-390
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
Saved in:
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