Factions and Political Competition

Nicola Persico, José Carlos Rodríguez-Pueblita, Dan Silverman

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico

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Year of publication:	April 2007
Authors:	Persico, Nicola
Other Persons:	Silverman, Dan (contributor) ; Rodríguez-Pueblita, José Carlos (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Politische Partei \| Political party \| Lokale öffentliche Güter \| Local public goods \| Wasserpolitik \| Water policy \| Wahlkampf \| Electoral campaign \| Interessenpolitik \| Lobbying

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w13008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w13008 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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