Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Brink, René van den ; Laan, Gerard van der ; Moes, Nigel |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 63.2012, 3, p. 388-403
|
Subject: | Wasserversorgung | Water supply | Fluss | River | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Core | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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