Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Year of publication: |
2010-09-20
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Authors: | Brink, Rene van den ; Laan, Gerard van der ; Moes, Nigel |
Institutions: | Tinbergen Instituut |
Subject: | water allocation | river game | externality | core | hierarchical outcome |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 10-096/1 |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; D62 - Externalities ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies |
Source: |
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, Rene, (2010)
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Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den, (2010)
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den, (2010)
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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
Brink, Rene van den, (2011)
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Independence Axioms for Water Allocation
Brink, Rene van den, (2011)
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A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den, (2012)
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