Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | van den Brink, René ; van der Laan, Gerard ; Moes, Nigel |
Published in: |
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696. - Vol. 63.2012, 3, p. 388-403
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Water allocation | River game | Externality | Core | Hierarchical outcome |
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