Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games

We give a mechanism fully implementing envy-free divisions such that: strategy spaces are symmetric, the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. As a byproduct, undesired mixed-strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Galbiati, Marco
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 100.2008, 1, p. 72-75
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005257691