Fair offers in a repeated principal-agent relationship with hidden actions
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cochard, Franc̜ois ; Willinger, Marc |
Published in: |
Economica. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0013-0427, ZDB-ID 1800-4. - Vol. 72.2005, p. 225-240
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Experiment | Theorie | Theory |
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