Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption

by Klaus Abbink

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

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Year of publication:	March 2000
Authors:	Abbink, Klaus
Publisher:	Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn
Subject:	Corruption \| reciprocity \| fairness \| public sector salaries \| Korruption \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Experiment \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Vergütungssystem im öffentlichen Dienst \| Public sector pay \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers / BGSE. - Bonn : Univ., ZDB-ID 2124986-6. - Vol. 2000, 1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/78377 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D62 - Externalities ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ; Betriebswirtschaft: Sonstiges
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846