Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
Year of publication: |
[2016]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nesterov, Alexander |
Published in: |
Three essays in matching mechanism design. - Berlin. - 2016, p. 81-121
|
Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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