Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
Year of publication: |
July 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nesterov, Alexander |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 170.2017, p. 145-168
|
Subject: | Probabilistic assignment | Random serial dictatorship | Strategy-proofness | Ex-post efficiency | Weak envy-freeness | Equal division lower bound | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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