Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Schmidt, Klaus M. |
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Institutions: | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät |
Subject: | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Multiple Tasks | Fairness | Experiments |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | IEW - Working Papers. - ISSN 1424-0459. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series IEW-working papers Number 191 |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs |
Source: |
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Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model
Fehr, Ernst, (2004)
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Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
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