False targets efficiency in defense strategy
The paper analyzes the efficiency of deploying false targets as part of a defense strategy. It is assumed that the defender has a single object that can be destroyed by the attacker. The defender distributes its resource between deploying false targets and protecting the object from outside attacks. The attacker cannot distinguish the false targets from the defended object (genuine target). Therefore the attacker has no preferences for attacking one target rather than another target. The defender decides how many false targets to deploy whereas the attacker decides how many targets to attack. The article assumes that both the defender and attacker have complete information and full rationality. The optimal number of false targets and the attacked targets are obtained for the case of fixed and variable resources of the defender and the attacker as solutions of a non-cooperative game between the two agents.
Year of publication: |
2009
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---|---|
Authors: | Levitin, Gregory ; Hausken, Kjell |
Published in: |
European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 194.2009, 1, p. 155-162
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Game theory Vulnerability Defense Attack Protection False targets Decoy Contest success function |
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