Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society
The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.
Year of publication: |
2003-02-12
|
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Authors: | Morck, Randall ; Yeung, Bernard |
Institutions: | William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan |
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