Family Ownership and CEO Turnovers

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family's presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family owners leads to the alleviation of agency conflicts, but the power of family CEOs leads to potential family entrenchment

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Chen, Xia
Other Persons:	Cheng, Qiang (contributor) ; Dai, Zhonglan (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Familienunternehmen \| Family business \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Kündigung \| Dismissal \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Arbeitsmobilität \| Labour mobility

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (3): 1166-1190, Fall 2013 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 30, 2013 erstellt
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; M41 - Accounting
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064039